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How are consumers’ interests taken into account when applying competition 
law? 
Anne-Lise SIBONY 
Note to interpreters 
It is likely that I will skip parts of the text below. Depending on the time which 
will be allocated to my intervention, it is my intention is to skip slides 4-10 in 
totality or in part. 
 
Thank you Mr. Chairman. 
Slide 1 
The topic I want to address in this presentation is how consumer interest is 
protected by competition law enforcement.  
This is of course linked to the question put to our panel: “what has 
competition law delivered to consumers?” 
Competition law enforcement will deliver something different if  
- the thinking behind it is that competition law is there to protect the 
process of competition among firms and that benefits from 
competition naturally flow to consumers in the form of lower 
price, greater choice and innovation 
or 
- if competition law enforcers think that consomers interests need to 
be taken into account as surch 
The difference is between inadvertent and incidental protection on the one 
hand and conscious and purposeful protection on the other. 
Slide 2 
In connection to this second view, I would like to quote our hostess today. 
Commissioner Kroes has – I daresay on a number of occasions – insisted that 
“defending consumers’ interests is at the heart of the Commission’s competition 
policy”.  
Note that, in this quote, “consumers’ interests” is in the plural form, 
which is not the case in the phrase “consumer welfare”, also often used in 
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speeches and policy documents. I’ll stick to the plural because I think it captures 
an important aspect of reality. 
Slide 3 
In order to discuss how consumers interests are taken into account, I was 
my intention to ask a three questions.  
First, “When are consumers’interests taken into account?” By “when” I 
mean at what stage of the decision making process are arguments relating to 
consumers either necessary, relevant or, on the contrary, superfluous?  
Second, if consumers interests are plural, it is important to know what 
consumer interests matter. This raises a double question: “what interests?” and 
“which consumers?”  
Finally, I would like to address a question which lawyers may view as a 
question of proof – or, more precisely, of evidential requirements – but which is 
more fundamentally a question of a cognitive nature: “ How do we know what is 
in the best interest of consumers?” 
I hope you will forgive me for rushing through the first question, as I 
don’t want to be too long and I don’t want to skip the second and third questions 
either. 
Slide 4 
Consumers interests is at the heart of competition law enforcement, but is 
it possible to be more precise and say at what stage of the decision making 
process is it taken into consideration? 
The answer is that consumers’ interests are present at two different stages 
- the framing stage, by which I mean when making architectural 
choices regarding the decision framework common to all 
individual decisions 
- the individual decision stage 
Slide 5 
At the framing stage, there are at least three different ways of taking 
consumers into consideration. 
First of all, when setting general enforcement priorities, the Commission 
can decide, for example, that “[i]n applying Article 82 to exclusionary 
conduct by dominant undertakings, [it] will focus on those types of 
conduct that are most harmful to consumers” as it recently did in relation 
to exclusionary abuses1. 
                                           
1
 Guidance on the Commission's Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 EC Treaty to Abusive 
Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings, OJ [2009] C 45/7, para. 5. 
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Second, when deciding whether or not to investigate a particular 
complaint, the Commission may, among other criteria, consider that cases 
that relate to consumer goods – rather than, say, turbopropellers for get 
engines – deserve more resources. Argualby, those cases are easier to 
advertise in the public at large and contribute to consumers understanding 
that competition law is enforced for their benefit. 
Third, and this is very important although somewhat less obvious, 
consumers interests are at stake when setting the Commission’s 
preference for one type of error over another. Let me explain. 
Slide 6 
Cases are often hard to decide. It happens that, even after carful enquiry, 
there is still a doubt as to whether or not a conduct should be prohibited. 
This is why it is important to have rules which say what to do when in 
doubt. These are a sort of default rules which say which way to go when 
evidence is inconclusive. There rules are not always explicit, but I think 
it’s fair to say that, in the enforcement of European competition law, the 
risk of harming businesses though over-enforcement is preferred over the 
risk of harming consumers through under-enforcement. Economist would 
call this preferring type I over type II errors. 
This choice regarding what errors the Commission most wants to avoid 
may be criticised, either in principle or as applied. 
But, and this is my point, it is a good thing to recognise that interests of 
consumers and interests of businesses are not aligned. This may seem 
particularly obvious to consumers associations and, more generally, to 
everyone using common sense. However, the reason why it deserved to be 
emphasised is because a very confused and confusing theory has gained 
acceptance in other jurisdictions. According to this discourse embodied by 
Professor Bork, consumer welfare is the same as total welfare, therefore 
consumers are not harmed if total welfare is increased – and it can be 
increased through more profits. 
In Europe, we may still debate whether we have got the balance exactly 
right between consumers interests and business interests, but at least we 
recognise that there is a trade-off, which is a good first step for not calling 
“consumers interests” something which has nothing to do with it. 
Slide 7 
Consumers interests are not only present at the framing stage, but also at 
the decision stage, when applying art. 81 and 82 EC to particular facts. 
In relation to article 81, it should be noted that showing consumer harm is 
not always required. Restrictions of competition by object are prohibited 
in and of themselves. Of course, we know that cartels harm consumers, 
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and we may think this is why they are prohibited. But here, consumer 
interest is merely a justification and a principled one. There is no need to 
show actual consumer harm and far less to measure it. 
Even for restrictions by effect, the legal test is “restriction of competition” 
not “consumer harm”. This being said, the Commission does consider that 
the exploitation of joint market power through an agreement, which harms 
consumers, is an indication of harm to competition. An indication of this 
can be found, for example, in the notice on article 81, paragraph 3. 
Slide 8 
Another stage at which consumers advantage is legally relevant is 
precisely when applying article 81 (3) EC. In deed, benefit to consumers 
is one of the conditions which must be met in order for an agreement to 
benefit from an exemption when it would otherwise have fallen under the 
prohibition of article 81(1). 
Here however, one note of caution is in order. The English text of article 
81(3) mentions “consumers”. However, other linguistic versions use 
broader terms, which would include both consumers and customers, such 
as “usagers” in French or “Verbraucher” in German. This ambiguity is not 
only at stake in article 81(3) but also very much at the centre of 
discussions on how to interpret and apply article 82. 
Finally, concerning article 81, consumer harm may be taken into account 
at the stage of setting a fine. More precisely the magnitude of consumer 
harm constitutes one element when setting the amount of the fine. 
However, it should be said that the guidelines on fines do not mention it 
explicitly. There are only indications that are consistent the fact that the 
amount of consumer harm is relevant when determining the amount of 
financial sanctions.  
Slide 9 
Consumers interests are also at stake when applying article 82 in 
individual cases. Here again, consumer harm is not explicitly mentioned 
in the treaty as one of the conditions for finding an infringement. The 
detriment of consumers is only mentioned in relation to one particular 
type of abuse, in the list of examples. More precisely, article 82 paragraph 
b) states that “limiting production, markets or technical development to 
the detriment of consumers” constitutes an abuse. 
This is not sufficient to clarify the role of consumer harm in finding an 
abuse in general. In this sense, it is not clear from the treaty whom article 
82 is meant to protect: is it competitors, consumers and/or customers?  
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Finding an infringement 
It is not apparent from the text of the treaty that consumers are at the heart 
of the enterprise of enforcing articles 81 and 82 EC. 
Slide 10 – art. 82 infringement 
Views on this have changed over time, as the Commission has stated in its 
recent communication on exclusionary abuses. “Anticompetitive 
foreclosure”, which becomes the core criterion for the Commission, is 
defined as a restriction of market access, which will increase market 
power of the dominant undertaking to the detriment of consumers (para. 
19).  
It remains to be seen if consumer harm will really become an autonomous 
criterion, if it will need to be shown in addition to exclusionary effect. 
It is too early to say, but the recent Intel decision of the Commission may 
be a case in point2. In this decision, as is well known, the Commission 
imposed a fine of over one billion Euros to Intel for abusing its dominant 
position by foreclosing AMD, a competing producer of processors. 
Foreclosure was evidenced by documents obtained by the Commission 
during the course of its enquiry, but what about consumer harm? 
This was a difficult question. Do consumers really care whether there is 
Intel inside their PC or AMD? The Commission found that some in deed 
do, but these sophisticated consumers are usually corporations3. If we turn 
to individual consumers, one could be forgiven to think that many of them 
don’t have a clue. They will buy a new PC when they are enraged with the 
one they have or when they feel their lap top is so heavy it’s causing them 
back problems, but the make of the processor will only rarely be a 
criterion for them, let alone a decisive one. In deed, this is exactly what a 
federation of consumers associations, which joined the case as an 
interested third party, pointed out4. 
I don’t want to suggest that the Intel decision should have been longer, but 
I cannot help to regret that, on this particular point, it would have been 
interesting to know a little more about the reasoning of the Commission 
and of the federation of consumers associations. My understanding is that 
it must have been along the following lines: consumers don’t realise they 
would be better of with more choice (here AMD based computers), but 
that is not a reason not to protect their freedom to choose through 
exemplary sanctions. 
                                           
2
 Commission decision of 13 May 2009, relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of the EC Treaty and Article 
54 of the EEA Agreement (COMP/C-3 /37.990 - Intel), D(2009)3726final. 
3
 Intel decision, para. 1607. 
4
 Intel decision, para. 1611. 
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Consumer choice is at the heart of enforcement of article 82, but is this 
consumer interest?  
Before I turn to this question, I wanted to briefly illustrate that there is yet 
another stage in which consumers interests are relevant for the 
enforcement of article 82. This is when choosing a remedy (I’m coming 
back to fines which I mentioned in relation to article 81). 
Slide 11 – remedies 
When the Commission imposes remedies, such as injunctions, consumer 
satisfaction is also a consideration.  
This can be illustrated, for example, from the Microsoft decision of 20045. 
In relation  the remedy imposed on MS to un-tie its operating system 
Windows and its media player, the decision states that 
“such bundles [bundles which the remedy will facilitate, i.e. windows 
with other media players] will reflect what consumers desire and not what 
Microsoft imposes” 
“the ability to choose the media player component of the bundle will be 
restored”  
(emphasis in the original) 
Again here, consumers interests is viewed primarily as consumer choice 
and I now turn to the next question, namely “what is consumer interest?” 
Slide 12 – consumers interests 
If we refer to the Commission’s own description of consumers benefit, we 
can see that it has three components, namely 
- lower prices,  
- better quality  
- and wider choice of new or improved goods and services 
Each of these component is present either in the treaty or in the case-law 
of community courts or both. The examples here are chosen somewhat 
randomly. In deed there is a number of decisions which refer to lower 
prices or wider choice. 
Slide 13 
Lower prices are surely the first benefit of vigorous competition from the 
point of view of consumers. This is expressed in the treaty, where it is 
stated that artificially raising prices is prohibited. Some Court cases also 
                                           
5
 Commission decision,   March  
 
, para. 1025. 
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illustrate that high prices could t be found abusive. Tournier is an old 
example about a very topical question: fees charged by national societies 
in charge of managing music rights. 
Regarding consumer choice, there are numerous examples. A classic one 
is the Magill judgement. In this case, the conduct of the Irish TV channel 
RTE was found abusive because it deprived consumers from a new 
product, namely a comprehensive TV guide including the programmes of 
all TV channels. This line of reasoning regarding consumers being 
deprived of new products was refined in Oscar Bronner and IMS and was 
illustrated recently in the Intel decision I just mentioned (para. 1605). 
Slide 14 
Access to technical progress is also a consideration when discussing 
consumers’ advantage in the context of competition law. Note that it is a 
different notion from access to a new product I just discussed, because a 
new product is not necessarily a technical innovation (a fatter TV guide 
can hardly be described as technical progress). This component of 
consumer welfare was discussed in Syfait, in connection with the issue of 
parallel trade. The argument put forward by the pharmaceutical company 
was that if parallel trade was allowed without limit, its capacity to invest 
in research in development would be reduced and therefore so would 
consumers access to new medicine. Unfortunately the Court judgement 
does not discuss this issue in depth, unlike AG Jacobs. 
Are there additional components of consumers advantage which could 
be taken into account for the purposes of competition law? This is an open 
question. In this regard I would just like to share with you my reading of 
the Asnef-Equifax judgement6. 
This case was about Spanish banks setting up an information sharing 
facility which was to allow any bank to access the credit history of a 
borrower. 
When considering, under article 81(3) the benefits that this scheme could 
bring, the Court held that 
“registers such as the one at issue in the main proceedings are capable of 
helping to prevent situations of overindebtedness for consumers of credit 
as well as, in principle, of leading to a greater overall availability of 
credit”.  
It then said that, these “objective economic advantages might be such as 
to offset the disadvantages of [the agreement]”. The Court did not go 
                                           
6
 Case C-238/05, Asnef-Equifax, para 67. 
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further. Since this was a preliminary ruling it said that “it would be for the 
national court, if necessary, to verify that”. 
What is I think noteworthy in this case is not the fact that facilitating 
consumer credit is, as a rule, to be considered as an advantage for 
consumers. The less obvious point is that the court seems to indicate that 
preventing over-indebtedness is also to the advantage of consumers. 
Surely, any reasonable person will agree that overindebtedness should be 
prevented as a matter of policy. But would a nearly over-indebted 
borrower think it is in her advantage to be denied a credit. This is not 
clear.  
My point here is that, just like in the Intel case, EC competition law 
sometimes takes a view of what is favourable to consumers, which 
may differ from consumers own opinion. 
In deed this touches on the second aspect identifying relevant consumers 
interests,  namely which consumers are we talking about. 
Slide 15 – groups of consumers 
The issue here is that there may be conflicting interests on the consumer 
side. Different groups of consumers may be affected differently by a conduct or 
by a merger. An illustration can be found in the Commission decision in the 
Tetra Laval/Sidel case7. In this case, consumers were customers. The clients of 
Tetra laval were companies that are in the business of bottling liquid foods. 
Depending on the sort of food a particular client was concerned with (milk, 
soups, iced tea), it would take more or less interests in offers combining cartons 
and plastic bottles and therefore would be more or less sensitive to leveraging 
strategies of the merged entity. 
There are also conflicts of interests between consumers and customers. 
The Syfait case, already mentioned, illustrates this nicely. In this case, the 
first beneficiaries of parallel trade would be pharmacists, who could buy 
medecines cheaper from parallel traders than from the official local 
distribution channel. It was less clear if end-consumers would benefit, 
essentially because it was difficult to know if pharmacists would pass on 
their gains, especially where patients would ultimately be reimbursed by 
their health insurance. 
These are obvious conflicts: between categories of customers and between 
customers and consumers. I am not aware of a case where conflicting 
interests of different consumer groups were addressed, but surely it 
doesn’t mean that such conflicts cannot arise. 
Slide 16 – quantitative question 
                                           
7
 COMP/M.2416, at para. 359. 
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There is another angle to the question “which consumers?” I hinted at it 
earlier, about the Intel decision. Is it enough to know that some consumers 
take chose their computer on the basis of what processor is inside. 
Shouldn’t we also know what proportion of consumers they represent? 
This is by no means a new question. In United Brands already, a similar 
question was at stake in connection with market definition. When the 
Court considered the question are bananas substitutable with other fresh 
fruits, it gave much weight to the consideration that for a certain category 
of consumers – those without teeth or not yet trained to peel fruits – 
bananas had the unique and irreplaceable properties of being easy to peel 
and to chew. 
One can only agree with the Court when it said that  
“the banana has certain characteristics, appearance, taste, softness, 
seedlessness , easy handling (…) which enable it to satisfy the constant 
needs of an important section of the population consisting of the very 
young , the old and the sick”. 
One can only agree but the question that the young, the old and the sick 
are a socially very important. However, from a competition law 
perspective, and for the purpose of establishing whether the softness of 
bananas is a relevant caracteristic for consumers in general, it would have 
been necessary to address the quantitative question: what percentage of 
bananas are purchased for consumption by very young, old of sock 
consumers? Products caracteristics are not relevant or irrelevant in the 
abstract. It is necessary to know for which consumers they matter and 
whether these consumers are in a position to influence market outcomes. 
This is what the notion of “marginal consumers” captures. 
Experience of competition law enforcement to date has taught 
competition authorities and courts themselves that the consumers that 
should matter when analysing a competitive threat are marginal 
consumers – the consumers that are likely to switch to a competing 
product – not the sentimentally important consumers. 
The final point I would like to share with you regarding “which 
consumers” enforcers of competition law should be looking at has been 
put very nicely by Eleanor Fox in a short fable inspired from little red 
hood8.  
The story goes like this: little innovative entrepreneur is visiting the Sick 
Economy. But in the wooden hut, under the night cap, it is big bad 
monopoly who is waiting. Little innovative entrepreneur is proud to show 
all the world-changing innovation she has brought in her basket. Then 
                                           
8
 E. Fox, An antitrust fable - A tale of prédation, Concurrences, N°3-2008, p. 1. 
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they engage in a very interesting conversation about predatory pricing 
under the law of the forest. And in this discussion, little entrepreneur, who 
is trying to save her skin, tries the following argument: “but if you eat me, 
consumers will suffer because they would lose the value of my 
inventions”. And big bad monopoly replies “consumers, ha!, the law of 
the forest is not about protecting real consumers, it is about protecting the 
idea of consumers”. And then he eats little entrepreneur. 
One possible teaching of this fable is that the competition authority of the 
forest should have real consumers in mind, not just the idea of consumers. 
This brings me to the final question I would like to address: how do we 
know consumers interests? And by this I mean real consumers’real 
interests. 
Slide 17 
The guidance notice indicates that “The identification of likely consumer 
harm can rely on qualitative and, where possible and appropriate, 
quantitative evidence”9 
This is a route paved with challenges. 
Slide 18 (skip) 
One question is: is evidence always needed or can likely consumer harm 
be inferred as it has often been from an alteration of market structure? 
The risk of this type of inference is that competition enforcement may end 
up delivering the wrong kind of benefits to consumers. Presumed cures 
for presumed harm. From a political or theoretical point of view, this is an 
issue of paternalism. How paternalistic can the Commission be with 
consumers? Can it really know better what is good for them? 
The Asnef-Equifax case I mentioned earlier may be a good pointer that 
some measure of paternalism is acceptable: we may think it is acceptable 
to say that the prevention of over-indebtedness is in the general interest of 
consumers, but at the same time we should in principle be wary of such 
generalisation. Or at least generalisation should have an empirical 
support. 
Another issue is the time horizon in which consumers’ interests are 
considered. Immediate benefits – e.g. lower price from parallel trade – 
may have to be balanced against long term losses – e.g. less innovation. 
This is clearly a very delicate exercice, but it does not mean that the 
question should be left to speculations. In deed it is only one of many 
challenges a competition authority has to overcome if it wants to take 
consumers interests seriously. 
                                           
9
 Para. 19. 
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Slide 19 – challenges (1) 
A first type of challenges comes from facts of life. There are conflicting 
interests in the consumer/customer sphere and they need to be indentified 
if the competition authority wants to avoid putting in the same box 
different groups of consumers or even opposing groups (consumers and 
customers). Conceptually, there is no challenge. The Commission and 
community courts refer to such groups of consumers. The challenge is to 
have an accurate segmentation of consumers at reasonable cost and within 
a reasonable time frame.  
Slide 20 – challenges (2) 
A more daunting challenge is methodological in nature. Consumers 
interests are sometimes addressed in terms of “consumer choice”. This 
economic terminology assumes that consumers have well-defined 
preferences over goods.  
We know this to be unrealistic. We know it when we take an honest look 
at our own buying behaviour, but we also know it from scientific work 
done thirty years ago by Kahnemann & Tversky. They have shown 
empirically and robustly that 
- Preferences are not given 
- Choices are not rational  
- Systematic biases can be observed 
The immediate teaching of this is that the notion of consumer welfare, 
which is based on contrary assumptions is not likely to be useful for the 
purposes of competition law enforcement, at least if competition law 
about real consumers. 
Can economics offer an alternative conceptual framework? Behavioural 
economics has embarked on this road, by taking on board well established 
facts concerning consumer psychology. Has it produced an operational 
framework yet? I keep asking the question to every economist I meet and 
my provisional conclusion is that it has not, but I would of course be 
happy to hear otherwise. 
Failing an adequate conceptual framework for approaching consumers 
interests, the Commission could rely on presumptions based not on prior 
assumptions but on empirical studies. There a crucial question is whether 
the large number of empirical studies conducted by psychologist are 
robust enough and relevant enough to be translated into legal 
presumptions. 
Slide 21 – challenges (3) 
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Finally, there are empirical challenges. If the Commission chose not to 
assume what consumers interests consist of but to study it empirically, 
how much would this cost in a particular case and generally? Could the 
relevant studies be conducted in a reasonable timeframe? Is the offer for 
such expertise sufficient?  
I will stop here with my factual, methodological and empirical questions. 
It is high time to conclude. 
Slide 22 – conclusion 
All I wanted to say is really this: consumers interests is at the heart of 
competition, but for many years it has been accepted to rely on very 
general ideas about how the heart functions. Now the time has come to 
engage in high definition imaging in order to gain a better understanding 
of how this heart really works.  
It is a precondition for competition law to bring real cures to real harm to 
real consumers. 
Thank you very much for your attention. 
